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SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN
METEOROLOGY IV
Tiberiu Popa
This article explores the main aspects of Aristotle’s scientiﬁc method in Meteorology IV.
Dispositional properties such as solidiﬁability or combustibility play a dominant role
in Meteor. IV (a ) in virtue of their central place in the generic division of homoeomers,
based on successive diﬀerentiation and multiple diﬀerentiae, and (b ) in virtue of their
role in revealing otherwise undetectable characteristics of uniform materials (composition and physical structure). While Aristotle often starts with accounts of ingredients
and their ratio (e.g., solids that contain a signiﬁcant amount of water are liqueﬁable),
the natural direction of his investigation is from observations regarding dispositional
properties and their manifestation to accounts of composition and microstructure. Such
passages tend to be easily syllogizable, a feature that—along with the criteria that shape
his method of division—argues, I believe, for the compatibility of Meteor. IV with Aristotle’s theory of scientiﬁc inquiry. The concluding sections of my article deal more
succinctly with reputable opinions and ﬁnal causation in Meteor. IV.1–11 and with the
relation between this treatise and Aristotle’s biological corpus.

Introduction
Aristotle’s attempt in Meteorology IV to outline a virtually new scientiﬁc domain
is an impressive feat, comparable—on a more modest scale—with his eﬀort to
Contact Tiberiu Popa at the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Butler University, 4600
Sunset Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46208 (tpopa@butler.edu).
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Mary Louise Gill and to James Lennox for introducing
me to Aristotle’s Meteorology IV and also for helping me over the years to appreciate the richness of this
text and its connections with other parts and aspects of his scientiﬁc corpus. I am also thankful to the
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science—in particular to Rose-Mary Sargent—
for helping the three of us to organize a session on Meteorolog y IV as part of an annual meeting of the
History of Science Society (San Diego, CA, November 2012). The stimulating comments made by
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2152-5188/2014/0402-0004$10.00. © 2014 by the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
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mark the boundaries of the study of animals, with which his ‘(bio)chemistry’ is
tightly connected.1 The study of organic and inorganic uniform stuﬀs and of
the processes that cause their constitution and their alterations ﬁnds its unifying and deﬁning principles in Aristotle’s sustained eﬀort in Meteorology IV
(henceforth, Meteor. IV) to demarcate its object, in his handling of scientiﬁc
method, and in his search for a distinct and suitable technical terminology,
covering kinds (or genē ) of homoeomers, the processes they undergo, and the
material dispositions that diﬀerentiate them. In order for Aristotle’s science of
uniform bodies to acquire a reasonably clear contour and identity and to bolster further scientiﬁc research, he had to organize its data in a suﬃciently articulate fashion. This clariﬁcation and organization of the substance of Meteor. IV
is achieved to a great extent by appeal to dunameis, or dispositions.2 All four books
of the Meteorolog y, along with other scientiﬁc treatises, circumscribe the realm of
‘for the most part’, eluding absolute necessity.3 In such a world, dispositions are
bound to thrive, so to speak, and to exhibit enormous diversity.
Material powers or dispositions (liqueﬁable, fragile, etc.) play a dominant
role in Meteor. IV (a ) in virtue of their central place in the generic division of
homoeomers,4 based on successive diﬀerentiation and multiple diﬀerentiae, and
(b ) in virtue of their role in revealing otherwise undetectable characteristics of
uniform materials (composition and physical structure). While Aristotle often
starts with accounts of ingredients and their ratio (e.g., solids that contain a
signiﬁcant amount of water are liqueﬁable), the natural direction of his investigation is from observations regarding dispositional properties and their manifestation to accounts of composition and microstructure. Such passages tend
to be easily syllogizable, a feature that—along with the criteria that shape his
method of division—argues, I believe, for the compatibility of Meteor. IV with
Andrea Falcon and by members of our audience, including Monte Johnson, after my talk at the HSS
meeting inspired many improvements in this article. Thanks are also due to the anonymous referee who
made a number of very helpful comments on the previous version of this article.
1. On the many and close connections between these two domains, see also James Lennox’s (2014)
and Mary Louise Gill’s (2014) articles in this issue.
2. I will use ‘disposition’ interchangeably with ‘material power’ or ‘potential’ and ‘dispositional
property’.
3. The phrase “rather [or: more] disorderly nature”—phusis ataktotera (Meteor. I.1.338b2)—suggestively reﬂects the condition of the sublunary world. On the polarity ‘always’ (unfailingly necessary)–‘for
the most part’, see Sorabji (1981), and see the Posterior Analytics 96a8ﬀ. on middle terms and ‘for the
most part’.
4. In Greek, homoiomeres (plural [ta] homoiomerē )—a homogeneous body whose parts display the
same properties as the whole and as each other. ‘Homoeomer’ will be used here along with synonyms
such as ‘uniform (or: homogeneous) stuﬀ ’ (or ‘material’, ‘body’, ‘compound’, ‘mixture’). On how homoeomers are formed, see, e.g., Generation and Corruption I.10 and II.7 and James Lennox’s (2014) illuminating article on the emergence of material complexity.
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theoretical texts like the Posterior Analytics (henceforth, APo.).5 Thus, my article
is also meant to be a contribution to the debate about the extent to which
Aristotle’s theory of scientiﬁc inquiry outlined in the APo. and elsewhere was
applied systematically in his works on zoology and on uniform bodies in general. One of my main claims is that a careful reading of Meteor. IV can lend
support to a number of recent studies devoted to Aristotle’s biological treatises,
studies that emphasize the robust links with Aristotle’s programmatic texts dealing with scientiﬁc understanding.
With these preliminaries in mind, we should be ready to explore Aristotle’s scientiﬁc method in Meteor. IV, chieﬂy the ways in which demonstration,
causal explanation, and the method of division are deployed there, so that we
can properly grasp the nature of his study of homoeomers and gain a more
reﬁned understanding of some of the larger philosophical issues looming in the
background of Meteor. IV.1–11.

Demonstration and Causal Explanation in Meteor. IV
In Meteor. IV Aristotle carefully sets out the principles that govern the formation and alterations of uniform bodies—organic and inorganic alike. Yet, for all
his scientiﬁc scruples, his readers might justiﬁably feel at a loss trying to grasp
the precise purpose of the many connections found, especially but not only, in
chapters 6–11: connections between dispositional properties of uniform stuﬀs
(liqueﬁable, liable to increase in density or to evaporate, etc.) and ‘chemical’
composition (earthy, watery, airy—in various proportions) or microstructural
peculiarities—consisting of interlocking parts (see 9.387a11–13), as in the case
of viscous stuﬀs, or having poroi, which are pores or invisibly ﬁne channels
arranged according to various patterns and pervading solid bodies. These connections are almost always accompanied by references to the eﬀects of the active factors, the hot and the cold, on the passive ones, the moist and the dry (in
practice, water and earth), or to mechanical processes, mainly in chapter 9 (e.g.,
impact, pressure, or stretching). Here is an example from chapter 7: “Potter’s
clay consists of earth alone [composition], because (dia . . . to . . .) it solidi5. The relationship between the APo. and Aristotle’s biological corpus has been a vexed issue. Scholars like G. E. R. Lloyd (1996, esp. 7–37) and Jonathan Barnes are reluctant to accept that Aristotle’s
scientiﬁc treatises follow the APo. faithfully. As Barnes (1975/1993, 37) puts it: “Aristotle’s scientiﬁc
treatises are never presented in axiomatic fashion. The prescriptions of the Posterior Analytics are not
followed in, e.g., the Meteorolog y or the Parts of Animals. These treatises do not lay down axioms and then
proceed to deduce theorems; rather, they present, and attempt to answer, a connected series of
problems.” Although Lloyd and Barnes have revised their original positions in some measure, they tend
not to stress suﬃciently the links that do exist between theory and practice, as Balme, Lennox, and
Gotthelf, among others, have done; more on this—later in this article.
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ﬁes gradually [dispositional property] when it dries. For water has no ways in
[eisodous, synonymous with porous here; physical structure], through which air
alone escaped, nor does ﬁre, since it solidiﬁed the clay [eﬀect of heat on that
homoeomer]” (7.384b20–22).6
Some of the correlations we ﬁnd in chapters 6–11 are not manifestly causal,
but many, indeed most, are. An indication that such connections are not merely
meant to organize the considerable amount of data gathered in Meteor. IV but
aim to help us discern the causes responsible for the emergence,7 presence, and
manifestation of dispositional properties is the number of inferential particles
and conjunctions used by Aristotle.8 The main diﬃculty for the modern reader
may not reside as much in detecting causal connections between categorical
properties like structure or composition and dispositions, as in ﬁguring out the
direction of the implied inquiry or demonstration: from dispositions to composition (or structure) or the opposite. A few chapters announce that direction
explicitly, while others indicate it obliquely; here are some examples.
The central goal of chapter 7 is to oﬀer a division of uniform materials according to the ratio between earth and water in the constitution of uniform
stuﬀs that solidify or liquefy through the agency of hot or cold.9 The opening
lines strike the keynote for the entire chapter, linking a certain material constitution to the corresponding disposition whose manifestation hinges on that
constitution as well as on thermic conditions: “Those things that contain more
water than earth [composition] are thickened by ﬁre alone [disposition], but
those that contain more earth [composition] are solidiﬁed [disposition]. Hence
(dio ) both soda and salt are more abundantly earth, and likewise stone and
potter’s clay” (7.383b18–20). The predominance of earth or of water is signaled here by the fact that a uniform body is prone to solidify or thicken if
the right factors (e.g., dry heat) are in place. This explanatory pattern can also
be found in other passages in chapter 7: if a particular kind of blood (e.g., that
of deer) is not liable to be solidiﬁed, it must be because it is watery; “hence
[dio],” the text goes, “such blood has no ﬁbers. For ﬁbers consist of earth and
are solid” (7.384a28). A further sign (sēmeion; 7.384a31) supporting this demonstration is that diseased blood does not solidify, as it has not been suﬃciently
6. The passages I quote from Meteor. IV come from a translation by Mary Louise Gill, James
Lennox, and me. The text we used is Fobes’s edition (1919/1967).
7. On the emergence of higher-level (material) dispositions and on the notion of mixis as presented in Generation and Corruption, see Lennox (2014, in this issue).
8. These include oun, ‘therefore’; gar, ‘for’; dio, ‘wherefore’; dia . . . to . . . , ‘because of ’, ‘on account of’, etc.
9. See 7.384a3 – 4: “Things that are combinations of water and earth are rightly spoken of in accordance with the abundance of one or the other.”
309
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concocted and mastered by its nature (phuseōs, implying natural heat), so it must
be serous and thus aqueous. A similar sort of proof, except for the absence of
references to the eﬀects of internal or external heat or cold, is oﬀered toward the
end of this chapter: ebony does not ﬂoat, for (gar ) other kinds of wood contain
a signiﬁcant amount of air, whereas ebony has a greater proportion of earth
(7.384b15–19).
Much like chapter 7, chapter 10 (388a26–27) assumes the task of grasping
“which sorts of uniform bodies are forms of earth, which of water, and which
are compounds.” Later in the same chapter Aristotle concludes: “So if all things
are either liquid or solid, and the properties of these are among the aﬀections
[pathesin, presumably dispositions like solidiﬁability] we have described, and
there is no intermediate, all properties would be mentioned by which we will
distinguish whether a thing consists of earth or water or is a compound of more
than one, and whether it is constituted by ﬁre or cold or both” (10.389a37).
He is thus primarily interested here in determining the composition of the
homoeomers by observing their behavior (i.e., the manifestation of their dispositions) under speciﬁc thermic conditions.
The goal of chapter 11, however, is to establish which bodies are inherently
cold and which hot “on the basis of what has been said” (389a25), that is, on
the basis of the just concluded investigation into the composition of uniform bodies in chapter 10. Cold can be regarded, he notes, as matter (hulēn ) of
some sort (389a29), since it is constitutive of earth and water, but most of the
discussion in chapter 11 suggests that cold and hot should be considered in this
context to be mainly a sort of emerging dispositional property, being due to
the eﬀects of the active factors on some underlying material. In short, the direction announced here seems to be from material constitution to dispositional
diﬀerentiae.
Elsewhere, in the absence of such programmatic or concluding passages, the
overall direction of the inquiry is revealed by the topic dominating the discussion. For example, in roughly the second half of chapter 8 and throughout
chapter 9 the emphasis is placed squarely on listing, deﬁning, and explaining
18 pairs of dispositional qualities10—passive powers (dunameis ), such as ‘breakable’ or ‘softenable,’ and corresponding resistive powers (adunamiai ), such as
‘unbreakable’ or ‘unsoftenable’. The prevailing goal in chapters 8 and 9, therefore, is to causally explain (at a purely material level) the nature of those dis10. Viano suggests (plausibly, I think) that these pairs of diﬀerentiae reﬂect the practical contexts in
which they tend to become evident and important: “Les propriétés passives des métaux (solidiﬁables,
fusibles, malléables, ductiles . . .), sont évidemment des propriétés exploitables par la métallurgie et
l’orfèvrerie. De même, les propriétés du bois (ﬂexible, ﬁssible, combustible, évaporable en fumée) sont
bien connues par le menuisier” (2006, 135–36). Pepe (1982, 26) makes a somewhat similar point.
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positions or powers by invoking the composition or structural characteristics
of the type of uniform material that exhibits a certain behavior or that is deﬁnable in virtue of a speciﬁc expected behavior (i.e., disposition or set of dispositions, qualities that can be manifested under the right conditions, such as natural or external heat, impact, etc.). Here is a purely ‘chemical’ explanation in
terms of the ingredients existing potentially in softenable bodies: “Softenable are those solids which are not constituted from water, as ice is, but are
more abundantly earth, and neither is all their moisture evaporated, as in the
case of soda and salts, nor are they out of proportion, like potter’s clay, but are
either elastic without admitting water or malleable without consisting of water, and which are softenable by ﬁre, as are iron and horn” (9.385b6–11). The
following passage oﬀers a physical or, rather, structural account of fragmentability and breakability: “Those bodies that are solidiﬁed in such a way as to
have many overlapping pores are fragmentable, for they divide up to this point;
those with pores that extend a long way are breakable; and those with both sorts
of pores are both” (9.386a15–17). And here is an example of a mixed explanation in chapter 9, involving both composition and physical microstructure:
“Absorbent [disposition] are those stuﬀs that, while consisting of earth [‘chemical formula’], have pores that are larger than the portions of water and harder
than water, whereas those things are meltable by water that are porous throughout [physical structure]” (9.385b20–22).
The examples surveyed so far suggest that there are two investigative directions at work in the bulk of Meteor. IV:
(A) One starts with the observation of (or at least assumptions about) the
behavior of organic and inorganic uniform bodies and, by also appealing to
the agency of hot and cold and to mechanical factors (pressure, impact, etc., in
chap. 9), leads to general accounts of the composition or microstructure of the
uniform stuﬀs under discussion; such general accounts are almost always accompanied by speciﬁc examples as well. These demonstrations thus rely on the
revelatory role of statements about dispositions as well as on law-like statements focusing on the active factors, cold and (natural and proper or external)
heat, or on some mechanical process.11 The inference is from what is more
easily accessible—the expected manifestation of derivative or emergent dispositions—to the ‘invisible’, that is, to the ratio between the ingredients existing
potentially in a homoeomer or the presence of poroi arranged according to
some pattern or other. We can sum this up as follows:

11. Freudenthal (1995) provides an excellent inquiry, among other things, into the role of natural,
innate heat, and its place in Aristotle’s theory of matter and of substance.
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If a genos of uniform bodies displays—or is expected to display—behavior (a ) under thermic or mechanical conditions (b ), it must have the
composition or structure (c ); examples follow.
Here is another illustration, from chapter 10, which is avowedly concerned
with determining the constitution—earthy and watery, mostly earthy, watery
and airy, earthy and airy, and so on—of the homoeomers: “Those [solids] that
have been solidiﬁed by heat consist of earth, for instance, potter’s clay, cheese,
soda [nitron, sodium carbonate], salts” (388b11–12). The inference from the
speciﬁc dispositional properties of particular stuﬀs to their ‘chemical’ makeup
generally involves three steps, which incidentally make such statements easily
syllogizable,12 although Aristotle never presents his arguments in such formal or
technical fashion in his Meteor. IV—or in the biological corpus:
Soda can be solidiﬁed by heat.
What can be solidiﬁed by heat consists of earth.
...
Soda consists of earth (and the same goes for other stuﬀs that exhibit a
similar behavior under similar conditions).
(B) The opposite direction in Aristotle’s inquiry into the nature of uniform
materials takes us from the composition or microstructure of a certain kind of
uniform materials to derivative or emergent dispositions or (passive and resistive) powers that are expected to be manifested under speciﬁc conditions like
cold, dry heat, and (in chap. 9) stretching, sudden impact, and so on. The purpose of such inferences is evidently not to shed light on what is more obscure or
elusive, as in A, but to causally explain the observable characteristics of particular stuﬀs and of the kinds to which they belong. These explanations can be
represented generically as follows:

12. On the syllogizable nature of many passages in Aristotle’s scientiﬁc treatises, in particular in
Parts of Animals (PA ), and on the methodological demands of the APo., see Gotthelf’s (2012, 153–
214): “Kosman’s thesis is that APo. should be understood as oﬀering a formal description of proper
science, not a requirement that proper science itself be formal. . . . On such a view, which as Kosman
has suggested is certainly an intuitively plausible one for Aristotle to take, one would expect PA II–IV to
have much the logical form it has now. For, whether or not the explanations can in fact be cast into
syllogistic form, there is much reason to think that Aristotle himself thought they could be so cast.”
312
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If uniform bodies of a certain kind have composition or structure (a ),
then under thermic or mechanical conditions (b ) they are expected to
display behavior (c ); examples follow.
In chapter 9, whose main criterion for the division of the homoeomers is their
dunameis, or dispositions, and which is intended to deﬁne and explain those
material dispositions, we read that “some things are combustible, others incombustible—for instance, wood is combustible, as are wool and bone, whereas
stone and ice are incombustible. Things are combustible that have pores receptive of ﬁre and have moisture in their longitudinal pores that is weaker
than ﬁre” (9.387a17–19). Such statements too can be reformulated in syllogistic fashion, as the underlying reasoning from composition and structure to dispositions seems to involve three stages:
Wood has longitudinal pores receptive of ﬁre and containing moisture
that can be overcome by ﬁre.
What has longitudinal pores receptive of ﬁre and containing moisture
that can be overcome by ﬁre is combustible.
...
Wood is combustible (and so are other uniform bodies that have a similar
composition and physical structure).
If we compare this syllogism with the previous one (under A), we can see
that the middles, the elements common to the premises (here: what has longitudinal pores, etc.; in the previous example: being solidiﬁable by heat), play
decidedly diﬀerent roles. As I have already suggested, the role of the middle in
an inference meant to help us identify the composition or microstructure of a
body (by resort to its dispositions and to law-like statements) is a certain dispositional property and is revelatory in the sense that it is meant to help us ﬁnd
or reveal the causes of the dispositional qualities of that body. The expected
behavior of a homoeomer under certain conditions is certainly not the cause of
the constitution of that homoeomer—quite the opposite is the case—but it
can presumably point to its causes, to what is otherwise imperceptible (poroi )
or hard to detect (the ratio between ingredients, esp. earth and water).
However, the middle (represented by composition or structure) of an inference that concludes with a statement about what disposition characterizes
some uniform stuﬀ provides the cause, in the strict and strong sense of the
313
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word, for that disposition. Wood, for example, would not be combustible, according to Aristotle, if it did not have longitudinal pores containing relatively
little moisture that can be overcome by ﬁre; such features causally explain the
presence and, along with other factors like exposure to heat, also explain the
manifestation of dispositions such as the combustibility of wood. While in
the course of scientiﬁc investigation, inferences starting with dispositions would
normally precede causal explanations, A-type and B-type inferences alternate
in the text of Meteor. IV, with the A-type inferences being the protagonists in
chapters 7 and 10 and occasionally showing up elsewhere.
The theoretical implications of this distinction will become apparent if
we consider a couple of celebrated passages in a treatise that outlines Aristotle’s
theory of scientiﬁc inquiry, his APo. In chapter 13 of book I Aristotle distinguishes between understanding ‘the fact’ (hoti ) and understanding ‘the reason
why’ (dioti ), within the same science (78a23–78b34) or in diﬀerent sciences
(i.e., ‘the fact’ being the object of a science; ‘the reason why’, the object of another science, as is the case with optics and geometry; 78b35–79a16). In order to elucidate the ﬁrst case—sciences that deal both with the fact and with
the reason why—Aristotle oﬀers a number of examples. The ﬁrst example goes
somewhat like this: from the fact that planets do not twinkle, one can infer that
planets are near (i.e., closer than the ﬁxed stars), provided one also posits that
what does not twinkle is near.
Let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A being near. It is true to say B of
C: the planets do not twinkle. And also to say A of B: what does not
twinkle is near. (Let this be assumed through induction or through perception.) Thus it is necessary that A holds of C, and it has been demonstrated that the planets are near. Now this deduction gives not the reason
why [dioti] but the fact [hoti]: it is not because the planets do not twinkle
that they are near—rather, because they are near they do not twinkle.
(I.13.78a30–78b3; trans. Barnes 1975/1993)
In this type of demonstration, then, the middle (not twinkling) is ‘the fact’,
intended to point to its own cause—if, again, we also hold that what does not
twinkle is near. Such inferences reﬂect understanding (epistasthai ) in a weak
sense. This example is reminiscent of those demonstrations in Meteor. IV in
which the middle is a disposition (e.g., meltable, ﬂexible) of some homoeomer,
and the conclusion states the composition or structure of that homoeomer. The
emergent material disposition does not explain, say, the composition, but it
does contribute presumably to our grasping that composition. Conversely, to
quote from the same chapter 13 in APo. I, “It is also possible to prove the latter
314
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through the former, and then the demonstration will give the reason why (dioti ). For example, let C be the planets, B being near, A not twinkling. B holds
of C and A of B: hence A holds of C. The deduction gives the reason why,
since the primitive explanation has been assumed” (I.13.78a39–78b3; trans.
Barnes 1975/1993). The middle here, common to the premises ‘The planets
are near’ and ‘What is near does not twinkle’, is the cause for what is mentioned
in the conclusion, ‘the planets do not twinkle’. This, in other words, is an
instance of a causal explanation that can secure understanding in the robust
sense of the word. Similar examples can be found in the ‘chemical treatise’; as
we have seen, in Meteor. IV (e.g., in chaps. 9 and 11) there is no shortage of
inferences in which the middle refers to the composition or structure of a
uniform stuﬀ and the conclusion states one of its dispositional properties,
whose nature is caused by—and is explainable through—the composition or
structure of that stuﬀ.
Although Meteor. IV.1–11 does not display a formulaic language studded
with symbols and neatly articulated syllogisms, it seems to reﬂect important
aspects of APo. I.13. In the language of APo., the scientiﬁc eﬀort to understand the nature of organic and inorganic materials in a largely nonteleological
context captures both ‘the fact’ (dispositional accounts of the homoeomers)
and ‘the reason why’ (the underlying causes for the characteristic behavior of
various kinds of homoeomers). Now, Aristotle’s study of animals, too, reﬂects
the case in which a science deals both with ‘the fact’ or the facts, including the
presentation and organization of data (this task being assumed primarily by his
Historia Animalium; hereafter, HA ) and with providing causal explanations or
‘the reason why’ for those data, that is, for why a certain kind of animal has the
speciﬁc set of attributes that it has, with respect to anatomy, mode of reproduction, and so on—this task being assumed by Parts of Animals (PA ) and
Generation of Animals (GA ), among other works.13
The diﬀerence between Aristotle’s biological corpus and his study of homoeomers is that the latter deals with both ‘the fact’ (to hoti ) and ‘the reason why’
(to dioti ) in one and the same work, his Meteor. IV, although the emphasis on to
hoti or to dioti alternates from one chapter to another. Besides, unlike in the
zoological works, in Meteor. IV.1–11 ‘the reason why’ is not spelled out in teleological terms, pertaining to the functions fulﬁlled by uniform parts in a living organism. Thus, ‘the fact’ (potentials like liqueﬁability) and ‘the reason
why’ (e.g., the ratio between earth and water in a uniform mixture that is liqueﬁable) are both situated at a material level and can grant only a partial in13. On this see Lennox (2014), esp. the sections “The Relationship of Meteor. IV, GA and PA” and
“Developmental Thermodynamics.”
315
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sight into the nature of the homoeomers; a more thorough understanding also
needs to rely on the discussion about functions—the other dioti, crucial to a
more comprehensive scrutiny of the organic homoeomers that are to be deﬁned
eventually not just in virtue of their material dispositions and constitutions but
also in virtue of their speciﬁc roles in the organisms of which they are parts.
Meteor. IV.12, which is properly examined by Mary Louise Gill (2014, in this
issue; see also Gill 1997), emphasizes the complementarity of material and
formal explanations and the relation between Aristotle’s study of uniform materials in general and his (ﬁnal) causal explanations as deployed in PA and GA.14
Here are the ﬁnal lines of chapter 12: “For we know in each case why and what
it is in the following way: if we get hold of either the matter or the deﬁnable
form, and most when we get hold of both causes of the generation and destruction, and also whence the source of the motion. When these things have
been clariﬁed, we must likewise study the nonuniform bodies, and ﬁnally the things
constituted from these, for instance, human being, plant, and other such things”
(12.390b17–22). In short, Meteor. IV appears to have a hybrid status: it is thematically autonomous, covering ‘the fact’ and ‘the reason why’ insofar as both
organic and inorganic homogeneous stuﬀs are considered from a generally
nonteleological angle; however, it aﬀords only a partial account of organic uniform
stuﬀs if we aim to also better understand their natures in their proper biological
context (the latter contributing the functional ‘reason why’, so to speak).
I will return to the relation between Meteor. IV and the biological works in
the conclusion of this article. For now, an additional clariﬁcation may be opportune here. Just as the two passages I quoted from APo. I.13 include general
statements that resemble what we would call laws of nature (“what does not
twinkle is near”; “what is near does not twinkle”), the arguments formulated
in Meteor. IV virtually always contain law-like premises: compounds of earth
and water are solidiﬁed both by ﬁre and by cold, what has longitudinal pores
receptive of ﬁre is combustible, compounds that contain more water than earth
are only increased in density by ﬁre, what has pores that extend a long way is
breakable, and so on.15 The consistent use of such premises suggests that our
sole awareness of a thing’s dispositions cannot get us to its composition or its
microstructure, but if you know that some material (e.g., silver) is likely to melt
when exposed to heat and if you also hypothesize that what melts contains
14. See, e.g., the end of PA II.5: “We have stated, regarding blood, serum, and soft and hard fat,
both what each of them is (ti ), and owing to what causes (dia ti ) each of them is” (trans. Lennox
2001a). This passage sounds remarkably like the end of Meteor. IV.12.390b15 –16: “Since we know the
kind to which each of the uniform bodies belongs, we must grasp what each is individually, for instance,
what blood is (lēpteon kath’ hekaston ti estin, hoion ti haima ), or ﬂesh or semen, and each of the others.”
15. On law-like formulations in Meteor. IV, see also Lennox (2014).
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water, then you can conclude that it (e.g., silver) contains water, which perhaps predominates in its composition.
By and large, Aristotle does not ﬁnd it necessary to explain to his readers
how he reached such law-like claims in Meteor. IV. He famously notes (Physics II.1) that, in natural philosophy, it would be superﬂuous to demonstrate
that there is such a thing as nature. But, whereas this may indeed be taken to
be self-evident, it is far less obvious that what is meltable (e.g., silver) contains
water. What are such hypotheses based on? Sometimes Aristotle appears to
tacitly ground his ‘laws’ on analogies (e.g., between an element and a state of
aggregation: water and liquid, earth and solid), a type of ‘confusion’ that is
quite pervasive in Meteor. IV. Similarly, he posits the existence of poroi, on the
basis of an analogy with various bodies like sponges (386a30; although possible
inﬂuences from other authors are not to be discounted).16 However, he does
not explain in Meteor. IV how poroi come about in various bodies, what determines the formation of distinct types of poroi, and so on.17 Poroi play an important explanatory role not only in elucidating how a liquid can penetrate
and alter a solid body but also in Aristotle’s accounts of ‘physical’ dispositional
diﬀerentiae such as fragility (386a9–17) and ﬁssility (386b26–387a3).
Analogical inference is also what enables Aristotle to contend that the tendency of olive oil to ﬂoat on water is due to its high content of air (after all,
air naturally moves upward; 7.384a3–8) and that amber is formed by solidiﬁcation and contains earth: “amber too likely belongs to this kind [i.e., solids composed of earth], and is solidiﬁed—animals are at any rate manifestly
trapped in it—and the heat driven out by river-water, as in the case of boiled
honey, when it is dropped into water, evaporates the moisture” (10.388b22–
16. I have not found any occurrence of the term poros in the Timaeus, although Plato is certainly
interested in the physical inner structure of various bodies and substances, this allowing him to explain
phenomena such as increase and decrease in density; certain interstices also account for the relative lightness, e.g., of bronze (59c). But, despite terminological diﬀerences (to poros, Plato prefers dialeimmata, 59c2;
diakenōn, 60e4; euruchōrias, 60e5; diexodon, 60e8; eisodos, 61a2; diakena, 61a5, 61b1, 61b4), similarities
with Aristotle’s account are startling. Empedocles too could conceivably have been one of his sources of
inspiration, considerable diﬀerences notwithstanding.
17. As I mentioned before, poroi can display several characteristics; again, Aristotle does not deem
it necessary to oﬀer a cogent demonstration of this fact. We learn from Aristotle that poroi can be
distributed in the mass of a solid body in diﬀerent ways—evenly, by fascicles, etc. (e.g., at 385b25—in
earth the pores ‘alternate’; cf. 386a16, 386b2ﬀ.); they can be arranged longitudinally; they can be ‘hard’
(385b21: [ porous] sklēroterous tou hudatos, literally, “[pores] harder than water”); or they can have different diameters: “pores that are larger than the portions of water” ( porous meizous tōn tou hudatos ogkōn;
9.385b20 –21; cf. Generation and Corruption I.9.326b30ﬀ.). On the question whether the causal
explanations based on the existence of poroi are reconcilable with Aristotle’s other tenets and with his
critique of Empedocles, see Baﬃoni (1981), 35, and Pepe (2002), 31–33, among others. The consensus
among contemporary scholars is that the explanations based on poroi (mostly in chap. 9) cannot prove
that Meteor. IV or part of it is spurious.
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24).18 Experiments too, rudimentary though they may be, can support some
of Aristotle’s statements about the composition of uniform stuﬀs; in chapter 7
(384a3–8) he tells us that new wine is not just a form of water but a compound of water and earth, since it is solidiﬁable when boiled; that it dries as a
result of the evaporation of water is shown (literally, “the sign is that,” sēmeion
d’hoti ) by the fact that if we collect the steam when the wine is brought to a
boil, it will condense into water.
I cannot delve here into a more detailed treatment of law-like premises and
of how Aristotle is likely to have produced such claims, but I should conclude
my brief comments on this point with a word of caution. When mustering
such principles, Aristotle scarcely betrays any hesitation. This attitude is, I believe, worth almost as much attention as the various aspects of his scientiﬁc
method. I would tentatively suggest, however, that the absence of any conspicuous and confessed hesitation on Aristotle’s part should not necessarily be
taken to indicate that he thought himself in full command of the ‘truth’, for
example, regarding the composition or the texture of a certain uniform body.
A passage in the ﬁrst book of Meteorology may be pertinent here. Right before
tackling the nature of comets (I.7.344a5ﬀ.), Aristotle admits that he has to
settle for less than sheer certainty. He considers that his account about what
is imperceptible (peri tōn aphanōn ) is reasonable (kata ton logon ) enough if his
explanation is at least possible (eis to dunaton ).19 This passage could have very
well prefaced Meteor. IV as well.
In my analysis of demonstration and causal explanation, and of the common points between their application in Meteor. IV and their treatment in
APo., I alluded repeatedly to the importance of the method of division as used
in this treatise. We should, therefore, take a closer look now at Aristotle’s handling of division, or diairesis.

Division
The concluding chapter of Meteor. IV, chapter 12, takes stock of the ﬁrst 11 chapters while also connecting this study of homogeneous materials, in particular
some of the organic ones, with the project that forms the next stage in Aristotle’s scientiﬁc program: the study of animals (see Meteor. I.1). He seems to
be thinking of those sections of his biological corpus, such as PA II.4–9 and
18. For more on the peculiar properties of oil in the context of Aristotle’s works, see Freudenthal
(1995), 175ﬀ.
19. For a recent study of the limits of Aristotle’s empirical standard for the assessment of scientiﬁc
theories, and for helpful comments on how Aristotle deals with the “paucity of appropriate perceptual
data,” see Bolton (2009), 51– 82.
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much of GA, where the nature of uniform parts like milk, blood, semen, and
marrow is considered both from the angle of their material constituents and
from that of the functions that essentially deﬁne them. As Aristotle puts it at
the beginning of chapter 12, “Since we have determined these things, let us
state individually what ﬂesh, bone, and each of the other uniform bodies are.
For we get hold of the things from which the nature of the uniform stuﬀs is
constituted, their kinds (ta genē ), and to what kind each belongs (tinos hekaston
genous ), through their generation. For from the elements are constituted the
uniform bodies, and from these as matter are constituted whole works of nature” (12.389b23–28). The end of chapter 12 resumes this idea in symmetrical fashion: “So if we get hold of the kind to which each of the uniform bodies
belongs (tinos genous hekaston ), we must grasp what each is individually, for
instance, what blood is, or ﬂesh or semen, and each of the others” (12.390b14–
16). The mention of generation (genesis ) and of the elements from which the
uniform bodies are formed is a clear reference to the very ﬁrst chapter of Meteor. IV but also, I take it, to the chapters (e.g., 7 and 10) in which Aristotle
sets himself the task of establishing the original ingredients of the homoeomers and the rough ratio (logos ) between them. Note that he states in the same
breath, at the beginning of Meteor. IV.12, that if we understand how those
stuﬀs are generated, we should also be in a position to provide a generic division into kinds, presumably based on their composition: earthy stuﬀs, watery
ones, mixtures in which earth or air prevails, and so on. Besides, as we have
seen, he also carves the domain of the homoeomers into kinds delimited by
their material potentials or dunameis (solidiﬁable, breakable, combustible, etc.).
Two observations should be made at this point.
First, the two types of inferences I discussed in the previous section, I believe, correspond to and indeed necessitate a division carried out along two
sets of diﬀerentiae:20 (a ) material dispositions like ‘meltable’ and (b ) compositional and structural features like ‘being mostly earthy’ or ‘having alternat20. The Greek term for division is diairesis, frequently used in the biological works. It does not
occur, however, in Meteor. IV (the verb diairein is used 11 times there but with concrete meanings like
‘to split’ or ‘to disperse’). One may be under the impression that diairesis aims in the biological works at
a classiﬁcation of animals, comparable with modern zoological classiﬁcations. Balme was a staunch critic
of such analogies. In several of his papers he pointed out convincingly that Aristotle’s divisions were
meant not to classify but to deﬁne, or, as Aristotle would say, to “hunt” for the deﬁniendum, to discover
exactly what an animal species is. In Balme’s words, “[Aristotle] does not carry the framework of division
across the board as in a classiﬁcation, nor does he create a terminology of orders, families, etc., as
Linnaeus did to establish such a framework. . . . Modern taxonomists have been mistaken in seeking a
classiﬁcatory system here. For in biology Aristotle uses only two taxonomic concepts, the genos and the
forms of a genos, and all attempts to ﬁnd regular intermediate classes have notoriously failed” (1987, 72).
In Meteor. IV the terms diaphora (‘diﬀerence’, ‘diﬀerentia’), dunamis (‘power’, ‘disposition’), pathos, and
pathēma (‘aﬀection’, ‘quality’) are sometimes used interchangeably: 8.385a5, 8.385a12, 8.385a20,
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ing pores’. The emphasis placed on one set of criteria or the other seems to
diﬀer according to whether a chapter is devoted primarily to deﬁning and explaining dispositional diﬀerentiae (as, e.g., in chap. 9) or to shedding light on
the constitution of uniform stuﬀs (as, e.g., in chap. 10). This diﬀerence in
emphasis, however, often becomes rather blurred; in chapters 6 and 7, for instance, the division according to the ratio between ingredients (mainly water
and earth) is not obviously more prominent than the one based on, say, distinctions between solidiﬁability by heat or by cold, even if the declared goal of
chapter 7 is to determine the amount of water and earth in the homoeomers
(7.384a3).
Second, demonstration and the method of division are interdependent in
Meteor. IV; furthermore, they are achieved simultaneously, in the course of
the same chapters. When Aristotle declares that “of those materials that are
thickened by ﬁre without evaporating, some consist of earth, whereas others
are compounds of water and air—honey consists of earth, whereas olive oil
is a compound of air” (7.364a14–16), he is attempting to demonstrate that
homoeomers that display a particular behavior under the agency of heat have
a particular ‘chemical’ composition, and he is indicating that honey, to take
this example, belongs to the group of stuﬀs whose thickness is increased by dry
heat as well as to a group that is describable in virtue of a certain content of
earth.
A quick glance at Aristotle’s HA will throw this second observation into
sharper relief. In chapter 6 of the ﬁrst book (491a6ﬀ.), Aristotle sets forth the
central goal of this treatise, which is to mark out the diﬀerentiae (diaphoras )
and attributes (sumbebēkota ) of all animals; this inquiry into the distinctive
characteristics of animals will then enable him to discover the causes (aitias )
that explain why a kind of animal has the attributes it has. This second task,
the discovery of causes, is fulﬁlled not within HA but in works like PA II–IV
and in GA. This presents a partial contrast with Meteor. IV. It is true that, in
order to properly understand the nature of animal tissues, one has to read PA II.
4–9 and sections of GA (that draw lavishly on Meteor. IV), in addition to
Meteor. IV itself.21 After all, PA and GA are centered on teleological explanations that point to the essential natures of such uniform parts. In other words,
10.388a10; see also the frequent use of the verb ‘to diﬀer’ (diapherein ) in the ﬁrst half of chap. 8,
among other passages.
21. Here are just a few passages in GA that seem to echo Meteor. IV: GA II.1.734b25ﬀ. (on heat and
cold as being capable of producing uniform parts with their dispositional diﬀerentiae but not instrumental parts, etc.); II.6.743a4ﬀ., 743a18ﬀ. (on the agency of cooling and heat); 743a36ﬀ. (same topic,
connected with the notion that both material necessity and ﬁnal causation should be assumed in the
generation of organic homoeomers); III.2.753a25ﬀ. (on the earthy nature of yolk).
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PA and GA provide ‘the reason why’; blood, for example, is what it is not just
because it is a liquid whose content of earth (ﬁbers, or ines ) varies from one
species to another and can coagulate, and so on, but also and principally because it is the nourishment for all the parts of the body and is also responsible
to some extent for temperamental features and for acuity of perception. Still,
as we have seen, Meteor. IV deals in a sense both with ‘the fact’ (the collection
and organization—which entails division—of data, based there on the distinctive properties of the homoeomers) and with one aspect of ‘the reason
why’—the underlying causes of the dispositional properties (e.g., the meltability of certain metals is caused in part by their content of water). Unlike in
HA, then, in Meteor. IV a discussion of ‘the fact’ is inextricably bound up with
a search for ‘the reason why’ (considered only at a material level), and both are
dealt with within the same work, the formal or teleological accounts being
announced in Meteor. IV.12 and supplied in PA and GA.
This being said, there is much that Meteor. IV shares with HA, as both are
designed to prepare the terrain for functional explanations like those oﬀered in
PA and GA. Thus, one of the main achievements of Meteor. IV is to provide
criteria for a reliable and clearly articulated division of the various homogeneous bodies into overlapping kinds,22 or genē—an enterprise that turns out to
be especially useful in PA II.4–9 and various portions of GA II and V. It appears, therefore, that a proper understanding of Aristotle’s method of division
in Meteor. IV could help us to explain more precisely the purpose of this book
on its own terms and also in the larger context of Aristotle’s scientiﬁc agenda.
Aristotle is likely to frustrate a modern reader who expects a classiﬁcation
in the modern sense of the word; he does not classify homoeomerous bodies,
for instance, into natural and artiﬁcial (alloys, etc.), the natural ones into inorganic and organic, the inorganic ones into types of stones and metals, the
organic ones into vegetal and animal tissues, and so on. And in Meteor. IV he is
certainly not interested in oﬀering individual accounts of homoeomers; virtually every homogeneous material, from wood to olive oil, is discussed at sev22. The technical terms (chieﬂy the use of ‘kind’, or genos, and ‘form’/‘species’, or eidos ) pertaining
to division in Meteor. IV are the ones Aristotle also uses in his biological writings. Genos (pl. genē ) occurs at 388b22; cf. 390b15; eidos (pl. eidē ), at 379b10, 17, 381b4, 23, 382b11, 13, 383b14, 388a26;
‘the more and the less’/‘by degree’ (mallon . . . hētton ), at 382a17. Genē are analyzable into eidē; the eidē
themselves can be regarded as genē in respect to the eidē into which they are further divisible. It is
worth mentioning that many of these genē/eidē do not have proper names, and, therefore, Aristotle uses
a sort of improvised nomenclature: ‘the earthy ones’, ‘the easily liqueﬁables’, etc.—a linguistic situation
comparable with that in his biological writings: ‘the soft-shelled ones’, ‘the live-bearing four-footed
animals’, etc. Compare Düring on the list of 18 pairs of dispositional diﬀerentiae in chap. 8 (discussed
in chaps. 8 and 9): “It is but natural that a writing of this kind requires a number of new words, some
of which were certainly fabricated ad hoc. This is patent to everyone in the case of the words with a
negativum” (1944/1980, 21).
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eral points in this book, in contexts that focus on material capacities or dunameis, on the ratio between the original ingredients, or on the types of poroi
present in solids. In his biological works, too, Aristotle ponders what may
be the best way to structure his study; in his treatise on what we would call
today philosophy of biology, PA I, he wonders (1.639a16ﬀ.) whether one
should consider the nature of each animal separately (kath’hekaston ) or whether
it would be more proﬁtable to lay down the animals’ common attributes (ta
koinēi sumbebēkota ) that are due to some common factor (kata ti koinon ). It is
the latter approach that he takes up in his HA—and the same goes for his
Meteor. IV, where he speaks of ‘earthy’ materials or ‘the earthy ones’, of ‘the
predominantly watery ones’, and of the ‘ﬂexible ones’, ‘the ones giving oﬀ
fumes’, stuﬀs that have many overlapping pores, and so on. The potentially
disorienting slew of such kinds in Meteor. IV amounts in fact to a careful division of uniform materials with respect to the processes they are liable to
undergo (and, so, with respect to their dispositional properties), for example,
solidifying or catching ﬁre, as well as by employing their composition and microstructure as causal diﬀerentiae.
Divisions are meant to organize the facts (see APo. II.13), in order to identify causal diﬀerentiae and to grasp ‘problems’.23 As Lennox puts it, with regard to Aristotle’s method of diairesis in his biological works (2001b, 35–36
n. 26), “Division is a way of organizing information for the sake of explanation/deﬁnition, not a method of discovering information.”24 Aristotle lays the
23. On grasping problems through divisions, see APo. II.14: “In order to get to grips with problems,
you should make excerpts from the anatomies and the divisions. Do this by supposing the kind common to all the items and excerpting—if, e.g., it is animals which are being studied—whatever holds of
every animal. Having done this, next excerpt whatever follows every instance of the ﬁrst of the remaining
terms (if, e.g., it is a bird, whatever follows every bird)” (98a1– 6; trans. Barnes 1975/1993).
24. Producing increasingly complex and enlightening deﬁnitions allows us, according to Aristotle,
to proceed from merely fumbling around (starting an inquiry with a rudimentary degree of understanding or amount of knowledge; APo. II.10.93b32–36) to grasping what a thing really is (i.e., formulating a causal account and thus acquiring understanding; see APo. 93a28 and 93a17–21). When
it comes to uniform stuﬀs and to fully deﬁning their nature, Meteor. IV may seem at ﬁrst to be just a
source of nominal deﬁnitions (which indicate for us the phenomenon that should be investigated; a real
deﬁnition points us to the cause of the thing that we are attempting to deﬁne; see APo. II.7). Compare a
Meteor. IV.1–11–like deﬁnition of ﬂesh as ‘a uniform stuﬀ that is mostly earthy, is ﬂexible etc.’ with a
functional account such as ‘ﬂesh is a uniform part that makes tactile perception and movement possible’. Yet, at least with respect to emergent material dispositions, Meteor. IV is meant to probe quite
deeply and to seek more than just nominal deﬁnitions of dunameis by revealing the underlying causes—
chemical composition and microstructure—and the conditions that lead both to the emergence and to
the actualization of those dunameis; chaps. 8–9 of Meteor. IV, e.g., are replete with such rich deﬁnitions.
As for uniform stuﬀs themselves, in order to get more complete accounts of them, we will have to look
them up in the biological treatises, where they are deﬁned by appeal to functions, or erga. On the
relation between division and deﬁnition, see also APo. II.13, e.g., 97b11–16, and Metaphysics Z 12.
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theoretical foundation for division or diairesis in several texts, including APo. II.
13–14 and PA I. In PA I, more than anywhere else, Aristotle is out to demolish
the method of dichotomy he attributes to Plato and oﬀers a fundamentally new
technique.25 My main suggestion in the next few pages is that Meteor. IV
largely follows the theoretical precepts conveyed in APo. II and PA I. Here is a
very succinct overview of the principles governing the method of division, as
put to work in the fourth book of Meteorology.

Successive Differentiation
In the Statesman, Plato divides animals into aquatic and terrestrial, terrestrial
ones into winged and what walks, and so on (264aﬀ.).26 Another example of
dichotomy is oﬀered by Aristotle at PA I.3.643b19–25: animals are divided
there into ‘winged’ and ‘wingless’, ‘winged’ animals being grouped into ‘tame’
and ‘wild’ or into ‘pale’ and ‘dark’. This arbitrary way of dividing cannot
guarantee that one will end up with a complete set of deﬁning characteristics of
a certain kind of animal. As a remedy, Aristotle introduced a requirement for
successive diﬀerentiation, meant to ensure that the ﬁnal diﬀerentia will entail
its antecedents (cf. APo. II.14.98a8–10). Footed animals, for example, can be
divided into two-footed and many-footed, the latter into four-footed, and so
on. Being four-footed, of course, is a sort of footedness; if footed animals were
divided into gregarious and solitary, it would be evident that such attributes
could not be derived from ‘footed’, except accidentally. Here is a relevant ample
from Meteor. IV. In chapters 5–7 there is an overarching contrast between solidiﬁcation and liquefaction; both processes (and corresponding material dispositions—solidiﬁable, liqueﬁable) are distinguished into subtypes, according
to whether they are caused by heating or by cooling. An additional criterion for
division is whether solidiﬁcation and liquefaction occur in watery liquids or in
compounds of water and earth (the latter being further divisible according to
which—water or earth—predominates).

Multiple Differentiae
Division, Aristotle recommends, must be done by multiple diﬀerentiae. If
footed is divided into two-footed and many-footed, and this category into four25. Its main features are discussed in a classic article by Balme titled “Aristotle’s Use of Division and
Diﬀerentiae” (1987, 69–89) and also in a study by Lennox titled “Divide and Explain: The Posterior
Analytics in Practice” (2001b, 7–38); this section of my article bears their profound mark.
26. For a recent and very helpful discussion of that section of the Statesman, see Gill (2012), esp.
179–85.
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footed and six-footed, and so on, this is a perfectly reasonable and legitimate
division; it is, however, glaringly insuﬃcient. To say that humans are twofooted and to say that elephants are four-footed scarcely gets us to the essence
of what a human is or at what an elephant is. The solution is to operate with
several divisions simultaneously. To get a ﬁrm understanding of the nature (in
a nonteleological context) of an animal in HA, you need to track down its
features in sections concerned with uniform and with instrumental parts, with
modes of reproduction, with diet, and so on. As I mentioned before, in Meteor.
IV, Aristotle divides uniform bodies according to two major sets of criteria:
(a ) the various dispositional properties possessed by those uniform stuﬀs and
(b ) their composition (earthy and watery stuﬀs, etc.) and physical characteristics (such as the presence of tiny pores or channels in a mass of, e.g., clay
or salt). In the end, if you want to know what the material nature of, say,
wood is, you have to consider all of Aristotle’s divisions and lists of dispositional properties and come up with a jigsaw puzzle of sorts: wood is a uniform
mixture that contains mostly earth and air in a particular ratio, has poroi
arranged longitudinally, is combustible, is ﬁssile, and so on. One and the same
composition or physical structure may correspond to several of the 18, or
rather 36, dispositions listed in chapters 8 and 9, since the same material, say,
wood, can be at the same time ﬁssile (schiston ), combustible (kauston ), unmeltable (atēkton ), capable of giving oﬀ fumes (thumiaton ), etc. Conversely, the same
disposition (e.g., meltability) can indeed be found in homoeomerous stuﬀs with
distinct compositions (diﬀerent ratios between dry and moist or earth and water),
but the disposition will be situated at diﬀerent points on the unmeltable–veryeasily-meltable continuum, for meltable stuﬀs as diverse as wax and silver.
This method of division is theoretically conducive to the formulation of
deﬁnitions, but they are likely to remain incomplete deﬁnitions in that context. Such divisions can help us to outline the material nature of salt, iron, or
suet, but, at least when it comes to organic uniform bodies (root, bark, suet,
blood, bone, etc.), Meteor. IV will not exactly reveal their essences, as, again, a
full account of their natures would require us to consider them in the context
of whole organisms and, so, to place them in a teleological context and to specify their respective functions (as suggested by chap. 12 of Meteor. IV and as
illustrated by much of PA II).

Division by Opposite Differentiae
In his summary and interpretation of PA I.2–3, Balme notes that “Aristotle
criticizes the kind of empirical division that would be made if in deﬁning
a colorless ﬁsh we were to divide animals into swimming and colored. This
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would produce a cross-division by changing the fundamentum divisionis, since
there may be animals that both swim and are colored. . . . At the end we could
not guarantee that the ﬁnal diﬀerentia is exclusive to our object” (1987, 75).
We need, therefore, to divide only by opposites. In Meteor. IV Aristotle is consistently keen on dividing by opposites, at a dispositional level or at the level
of material constitution: solidiﬁable stuﬀs can be divided into those that are
solidiﬁed by cold and those that are solidiﬁed by heat; compounds can be divided into those in which earth predominates and compounds in which water predominates. Although it is preferable to divide by positive opposites (A
and B; see Balme 1987, 76) rather than by negative diﬀerentiae (A and nonA), Aristotle does not shun divisions where the presence of some dunamis
is seemingly contrasted with its absence. One of the most obvious examples
is his list of dispositions in chapters 8 and 9 and, implicitly, his division of
homoeomers into groups characterized by 18 pairs of dispositional properties
(dunameis and adunamiai ): capable or incapable of solidiﬁcation, meltable or
unmeltable, softenable by heat or unsoftenable by heat, and so on. Nonetheless, adunamiai like ‘unmeltable’ or ‘unsoftenable by heat’ are not mere instances of privation or sterēsis but can be regarded as ‘positive’ states or properties, insofar as they are resistive powers—in these cases, the power or dunamis
to resist some agency of heat or pressure, impact, etc.

‘The More and the Less’
Let me conclude this succinct enumeration of points of convergence between
the use of the division, or diairesis, in Meteor. IV and Aristotle’s theoretical
precepts regarding this method, by calling attention to divisions made in terms
of degrees.27 A comparison between signiﬁcantly diﬀerent kinds of animals
can be facilitated by analogy (lungs–gills, feathers–scales, etc.); however, when
marking distinctions between animals pertaining to diﬀerent forms that belong within the same kind, Aristotle relies on degrees or ‘the more and the less’
(e.g., species of birds can be compared and contrasted by pointing out that
one has a larger beak than some other species; see PA I.4.644b7–14). Aristotle’s ‘chemistry’ is not quantitative in any rigorous way, but he does attempt to
differentiate between various ratios in the material composition of stuﬀs belonging to the same genos; in chapter 6 of Meteor. IV, for instance, Aristotle
distinguishes compounds of earth and water between those in which earth predominates and those in which water is the dominant ingredient; furthermore,

27. For more details, see chap. 7 in Lennox (2001b), 160–81.
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among the former (in which earth is prevailing), one can discern various degrees
in the preponderance of earth.28 Degrees in the predominance of some ingredient
appear to correspond (along with diﬀerences in the conﬁguration of the pores,
or poroi ) to diﬀerent positions of dunameis along continua such as absorbent–
nonabsorbent or combustible–incombustible.
The division of homoeomers in Meteor. IV is certainly not exhaustive. For
instance, almost nothing is said in Meteor. IV about active derivative dispositions.29 Yet, while Aristotle’s overall purpose in this book is not to provide a
complete and detailed classiﬁcation of homogeneous compounds, he does succeed in producing a set of generic divisions—made in a spirit remarkably reminiscent of PA I—that are meant both to organize a vast amount of information and to bolster further investigation into the nature of organic uniform
stuﬀs. These materials will become the object of renewed scrutiny in the biological works, where the study of various tissues (considered separately, kath’hekaston ) will include a systematic search for their deﬁning functions.

Notes on Endoxa and on Teleology in Meteor. IV.1–11
Before I conclude, let me add two notes on what readers familiar with some of
Aristotle’s other scientiﬁc works might expect to ﬁnd in Meteor. IV but will not:
a systematic discussion and criticism of endoxa and a sustained appeal to ﬁnal
causation. The review and evaluation of reputable opinions, or endoxa, is a
staple of Aristotle’s method and rhetoric of science, yet, in Meteor. IV, such
endoxa are all but absent. Aristotle deﬁnes this concept at the beginning of his
Topics (I.1.100a30–b23), where he is concerned with the distinction between
several types of reasoning (sullogismos ). Dialectical reasoning takes its starting
point from endoxa, opinions that are embraced by everyone or by the majority
or by the wise (either by all or the majority or the most famous and reputable—
malista gnōrimois kai endoxois—among the wise). In most of his scientiﬁc
works, Aristotle readily engages established theories formulated by other thinkers and deﬁnes his own views against this background. He seems, however, in
no dialectical mood in Meteor. IV, which is decidedly atypical for him and is
surprising especially if one compares Meteor. IV with other treatises, including

28. See, e.g., pleon echontōn gēs (“containing more earth”) at 383a27.
29. A few exceptions can be found at 8.385a2– 4 and 10.388a12, where Aristotle lists perceptible
properties like white and sweet; they are contrasted in chap. 8 with passive ( pathētika) or ‘more proper’
qualities (oikeioterois; cf. Physics VII.246b10, where oikeia pathē are said to be responsible for the natural
generation and destruction of things).
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Meteor. I–III, where he invokes and takes his predecessors to task with rather
remarkable frequency.30
In the fourth book of the Meteorology Aristotle is content to only quote
Empedocles twice—to express his agreement with him and to avail himself of
the suggestiveness of memorable dicta.31 Occasionally we ﬁnd an impersonal
“it is said” or “they say” (legetai ); for instance, at 382b9 we read that “cold is
said to burn,” but, again, this is not meant to suggest a diﬀerence of position
from Aristotle’s but to muster what he takes to be a common perception of the
eﬀects of cold in support of his own statement that cold is primarily an active
factor. At most, he appears sometimes to complete or clarify a common opinion or an earlier account (e.g., in chap. 11, at 389b13ﬀ., a passage where he
seeks to provide a clariﬁcation, rather than a rebuttal, about what qualiﬁes as
hot or cold). The reason for this consistent and unusual lack of emphasis on
endoxa in Meteor. IV may be the sheer novelty of Aristotle’s comprehensive
approach.32 Or it may be that some ‘reputable opinions’ and some popular
views could have been tacitly incorporated into the substance of this book,
alongside Aristotle’s own observations, but any solution to this puzzle is likely
to remain a matter of speculation, and so I prefer to end my note about this
peculiar absence in aporetic fashion.
Less mysterious but equally striking is the scarcity of references to ﬁnal causation throughout most of Meteor. IV, with the notable exception of the last
chapter, chapter 12, whose treatment of ﬁnal causes is intrinsically and programmatically interesting. One of the problems raised in chapter 12 is whether
the agency of hot and cold is suﬃcient for the formation of organic uniform
stuﬀs like ﬂesh, a problem discussed in detail and elucidated in Gill (2014).
30. That Aristotle’s review and critique of his predecessors’ theories is a central aspect of his method
in books I–III is stressed by Freeland (1990, 317): “In his preliminary studies of the endoxa, I have
argued, Aristotle both focuses his theoretical inquiry by reﬁning why-questions, and directs his search
for empirical data by noting failures and missed predictions of earlier scientists.” See also the section
“The Role of Endoxa” in Taub’s history of ancient meteorology (2003, 93 –96), centered on the theoretical background of Meteor. I–III.
31. The two passages deal with the presence of water in compounds, water ensuring their cohesion
(Meteor. IV.4.381b29–382a2), and with the use of analogy in reference to things that share certain
properties but do not form categories that have common names (e.g., at 9.387b1– 6, bones and hair are
said to belong to the group of homoeomers that emit fumes when burned; Empedocles’s example,
incidentally, is quite diﬀerent and points to the shared—protective ?—function of hair, leaves, feathers,
and scales).
32. This seems to be Viano’s view: “Pourquoi alors, pourrait-on se demander avec raison, n’aurait-il
pas utilisé les théories des prédécesseurs sur la cause materielle pour expliquer les transformations de
la matière visible? La réponse peut être très simple: parce qu-il pensait que personne avant lui n’avait
abordé ce domaine” (2006, 28).
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The prominence of the discussion about ﬁnal causation in Meteor. IV.12 is
underscored by the insistent use of the formula “that for the sake of which”
(heneka tou or to hou heneka, at 389b31, 390a4, and 390a8) and by reminders
that ﬁnal causes are tightly bound up with the natures and deﬁnitions of artifacts as well as of the products of nature. A certain material composition or a
particular shape would not suﬃce for, say, a hand to actually be a hand. The
hand of a dead man is a hand in name only (homōnumōs; 389b33, 390a1);
a stone ﬂute is a ﬂute in name only. If a hand is to be indeed a hand, it has
to display the proper dispositional properties, and, more importantly (though
relatedly), it has to be able to perform certain functions,33 and so, implicitly, it
has to serve some goals.
Like Plato (signiﬁcant diﬀerences notwithstanding),34 Aristotle was not
satisﬁed with the reductionist approach of the earlier natural philosophers (hoi
phusiologoi ).35 The regularity observable within kinds (genē ) and forms (eidē )
of animals, as well as the remarkable complexity displayed by most organisms,
Aristotle thought, could not possibly be the result of haphazard conglomerations of elementary particles. Rather, they have to be explained by reference to
hierarchically organized ﬁnal causes:36 elements are for the sake of homogeneous stuﬀs, (organic) homogeneous stuﬀs are for the sake of the nonuniform
or instrumental parts of which they are constitutive, and organs are for the sake
of organisms of which they are functional parts.37 The theoretical manifestos of
Aristotle’s teleology are Physics II (esp. chap. 8) and PA I.1, although many
other texts are replete with explicit references to ﬁnal causation.
Chapters 1–11 of Meteor. IV, however, rely largely on material and eﬃcient
causation to explain the nature of uniform bodies and the changes they undergo, ranging from generation and destruction to diﬀerent types of alteration.
Thus, the contrast between Meteor. IV.1–11 (and also Meteor. I–III) and some
of the other extant scientiﬁc works by Aristotle may be perplexing at ﬁrst sight.
Still, a qualiﬁcation is in order here. Hints at ﬁnal causation are scarce but,

33. In Greek, erga; e.g., 390a11: seeing is the function of the eyes.
34. Whereas in Plato ‘nature’ is a product of technē, being fashioned by the divine craftsman and his
aides, Aristotle, in his biology, is committed to a truly natural teleology (for a detailed account of ﬁnal
causation in Plato, see “Plato’s Unnatural Teleology” in Lennox [2001b, 280–302]).
35. See, among other relevant passages, Aristotle’s attack (in GA V.8) on Democritus, who had no
use for ﬁnal causes.
36. See, e.g., PA II.1.646b5ﬀ. (elements are for the sake of the uniform parts, which are for the sake
of nonuniform parts) and Lennox’s comments on this section (2001a, 182); cf. Meteor. IV.12.
37. For a more detailed discussion about this hierarchy of levels of ﬁnal causation, see Lennox’s
(2014) comments on PA II.1 and GA II.6 and Gill (2014).
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I believe, not entirely absent from Meteor. IV.1–11.38 Chapters 2 and 3, for
example, hold an interesting place in Meteor. IV. While pepsis, or concoction
(a process that is essential to many of Aristotle’s explanations in his biological
corpus),39 is rarely mentioned in the rest of Meteor. IV,40 chapters 2 and 3 deal
in great detail with both complete and partial concoction. Pepsis is described
and explained not solely in terms of a uniform body’s natural heat mastering
the moisture in that body, such as the pulp of a fruit, but also with a view to
some telos (‘end’, ‘end point’, ‘completion’) in a process, which can be natural
(e.g., fruition) or artiﬁcial (e.g., cooking).41 A telos is not necessarily a ﬁnal
cause, but it can entail it, for instance, in contexts in which the type of
concoction under discussion aﬀects a uniform part belonging to a substance, in
Aristotelian terms, such as a plant (when it comes to the production of seeds
and their generative power) or a human being. Here are a couple of passages
relevant to this point:
In some cases the end (telos ) is their nature—that is, nature in the sense
of form and substantial being (eidos kai ousian ); but in other cases the
end of the concoction is a certain underlying structure (hupokeimenēn
tina morphēn ), when the moist comes to be of a certain sort and a certain amount either by being roasted or boiled or ripened or in some other
way heated; for at that time the moist is useful (chrēsimon ), and we say
38. Apart from chaps. 2 and 3, where ﬁnal causes are actually invoked, albeit sketchily, in order to
spell out the notion of pepsis, there are mentions of formal and ﬁnal causes in chaps. 5 (at 382a28–30)
and 10, but they are not accompanied by much elaboration. The passage in chap. 10 seems to preﬁgure
some of the points made in chap. 12: “Since the nonuniform bodies are constituted by another cause,
whereas the matter from which these are constituted is the dry and moist, and therefore water and earth
(for each of these has the very conspicuous potency of one or the other of those), while the productive
potencies are heat and cold (for heat and cold constitute and solidify bodies from the dry and moist), let
us grasp which sorts of uniform bodies are forms of earth, which of water, and which are compounds”
(10.388a20 –25).
39. As Lloyd (1996, 83) notes, “‘Concoction’ ( pepsis ) is used in an amazing variety of contexts
throughout Aristotle’s natural science and most especially in his zoology, where it must rank as one of
his key concepts.” The generic discussion in Meteor. IV, comprising deﬁnitions and examples as well as a
division into three species of concoction and three species of incomplete concoction, seems intended to
put some order in that “amazing variety.”
40. There are two mentions made in passing at Meteor. IV.7.384a33 (apepton ) and 11.389b8
( pepsasēs ). The process itself, which involves an increase in density, among other things, is described
elsewhere in some detail but with no reference to a goal or, more neutrally, to an end point (telos ) of any
kind, e.g., at 6.383a14ﬀ. and at the very beginning of chap. 7.
41. See, e.g., 3.381a2– 4: “The end (telos ) is not the same for all things, either for things being
boiled or for things being concocted, but some for eating, others for drinking, and others for some
other use (chreian ), since we say that we boil drugs.”
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that concoction has occurred, as in the case of new wine, the compounds
in tumors when they become pus, and tears when they become rheum,
and so on. (2.379b25–33)42
And another example: “Ripening is a sort of concoction. For concoction of the
nutrient in the pod is called ripening. Since concoction is a completing, the
ripening is complete precisely when the seeds in the pod are able to complete
another thing of the same sort—for we speak in this way of completeness in
other cases too” (3.380a11–16).
Although I believe it is worth pointing out that Meteor. IV.1–11 is not entirely devoid of teleological accents, as I have suggested here, it is certainly the
case that, unlike in chapter 12, a treatment of ﬁnal causation is not a central
concern of the bulk of book IV. The reader of this article should, therefore, not
be surprised that I have not dwelled at length on this topic—which is so pervasive in many other Aristotelian writings—or that, as I explained earlier, I
have not focused on the handling of endoxa in this treatise.

Conclusion
The main contribution of this article is an analysis of the ways in which demonstration, causal explanation, and division are put to work in the fourth book
of the Meteorolog y, these methodological aspects being reminiscent of Aristotle’s biological corpus. The general upshot of this analysis is hopefully a
strengthening of the view that his more ‘applied’ scientiﬁc works largely follow the precepts put forth in his theory of scientiﬁc inquiry, as presented
mostly in APo. and in PA I. I will not summarize my various points here; instead, I would like to return brieﬂy to the distinction between ‘the fact’ and
‘the reason why’ and to the relation between Meteor. IV and the biological
corpus.
A cursory reading of Meteor. IV might leave us with the impression that,
in comparison with PA and GA, Meteor. IV is only centered around the ‘what’,
ti, and is concerned merely with collecting and organizing facts in a generic
fashion, whereas, say, PA (esp. II.4–9) will explain what uniform stuﬀs are separately (kath’ hekaston ) by providing ‘the reason why’, dioti, based, in addition
to the analysis of the material constitution of the homoeomers, on functional

42. This passage is reminiscent of Plato’s Timaeus 83de; see also the Hippocratic works On Ancient Medicine (beginning of chap. 19 in modern editions; note the use of pephthēnai ) and Aﬀections
34 (where the verb pepainein, ‘to ripen’ or ‘to reach maturity’, is used); cf. Anonymus Londinensis
XI.43.
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explanations and, implicitly, on ﬁnal causation.43 Accordingly, the fourth book
of Meteorolog y, along with parts of PA, may seem to reﬂect a relationship, circumscribed in APo. I.13, in which the ‘what’ and the ‘reason why’ are the focus
of diﬀerent sciences. In APo. I.13, at 78b36ﬀ., Aristotle points out that, in the
case of sciences devoted either to the study of ‘the fact’ or to the study of ‘the
reason why’, the former are subordinated to the latter (thateron hupo thateron ):
this is the relationship between optics and geometry, mechanics and solid geometry, harmonics and arithmetic, contemplation of ﬁxed stars or planets and
astronomy. Thus, one might assume that Aristotle’s ‘biochemistry’ is strictly subordinated to his ‘zoology’, to use two convenient anachronisms.
Such a conclusion, however, should be considered with caution. Subordinate sciences, according to APo., display a more empirical or less theoretical44
nature than the corresponding ‘supraordinate’ ones, which “possess demonstrations which give the explanations, and often they [i.e., the mathematical
scientists] do not know the fact—just as people who study universals do not
know some of the particulars through lack of observation” (trans. Barnes 1975/
1993).45 PA II.4–9 relies massively on the observation of various types of
blood, fat, and so on, which allows us to discern their dispositions and, by appeal to Meteor. IV, to acquire insight into their material composition, so PA II
does not appear to be any less empirical than Meteor. IV.46 In practice, generic
divisions like the ones made in Meteor. IV would have to be preceded by and
would be perhaps ‘more theoretical’ or abstract than minute and individual observations of particular uniform stuﬀs. Moreover, as I suggested in my section on
demonstration and causal explanation, Meteor. IV is very much a work on ‘the
reason why’ (to dioti ), except that this aspect too is situated at the level of material explanation, insofar as ‘chemical’ combination and structural peculiarities
cause (i.e., are ‘the reason for’) the presence of dispositional properties like ‘liq-

43. The text of Meteor. IV certainly uses this language on a few occasions, language that evokes the
terminology of APo. In Meteor. IV.3, e.g., at 381b21–22, Aristotle concludes his discussion of concoction and inconcoction by saying: “We have now discussed what [ti . . . esti] concoction and inconcoction are, as well as ripening and rawness, and boiling and roasting and their opposites.” I am
thankful to James Lennox for drawing my attention to this passage.
44. The contrastive pair of terms is aisthētikon, mathēmatikon.
45. On the priority of some sciences with respect to others, see also APo.: “One science is more exact (akribestera ) than another and prior to it ( protera ) if it is concerned both with the facts (hoti ) and
with the reason why (dioti ) and not with the facts separately from the science of the reason why; or if it
is not said of an underlying subject and the other is said of an underlying subject (as, e.g., arithmetic is
more exact than harmonics); or if it proceeds from fewer items and the other from some additional
posit (as e.g. arithmetic is more exact than geometry)” (I.27.87a31–35; trans. Barnes 1975/1993). For
the place of eidē in the ‘supraordinate’ sciences, see APo. I.13.
46. For more on this, see Lennox (2014).
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ueﬁable’ and ‘ﬂexible’ in homoeomers and, together with the agency of heat or
cold, can account for the manifestation of such dispositions. To that extent, then,
Aristotle’s ‘chemistry’ also illustrates the situation, discussed in APo., in which one
and the same science deals both with ‘the fact’ and with ‘the reason why’.
The one very important respect in which Meteor. IV does ﬁnd itself in a
position of subordination with respect to treatises like PA II is, of course, that
Meteor. IV speaks at length about the potentials and constitution of uniform
stuﬀs, without, however, providing a full picture of their natures. In other
words, the material accounts presented in Meteor. IV.1–11 provide only a partial understanding of the uniform parts, whereas PA and GA signiﬁcantly complete these accounts by refocusing our attention on the functions fulﬁlled by
the organic homoeomers within the more complex structures of which they
are constitutive parts. Even if book IV of the Meteorology is subordinate in this
way to sections of Aristotle’s biological works, I hope that my examination of
the scientiﬁc method in Meteor. IV can assure its reader that this work still
deserves our interest both for its inherent merits and for the light it can cast
on the relation between the theory and practice of Aristotelian science. Had a
less propitious tradition handed down to us nothing of Aristotle’s ‘akroamatic’
notes but this treatise on homoeomers, he would probably still be no negligible
ﬁgure in the history of science and philosophy of science.
To sum up, one should not overstate the autonomy of the ‘chemical treatise’, as there is no denying that the scientiﬁc enterprise achieved by Meteor. IV
rests on the foundation prepared in Generation and Corruption (see Lennox
2014), On the Heavens, and, in a smaller measure, in Meteor. I–III,47 and in a
way ﬁnds its fulﬁllment in works like PA and GA. Still, although Meteor. IV
can be—and has been—regarded as a prolegomenon to Aristotle’s biology,48
especially to those treatises or sections that deal with simple or uniform parts,
this book is not simply contingent or somehow parasitic on works like PA II
but has very much its own worth. Meteor. IV goes far beyond organizing uniform stuﬀs according to material dispositions and glimpses, as it were, at what
some of those dispositions are signs of: the composition and the physical constitution of uniform materials. It explains phenomena that may be less majestic
than the ones discussed in Meteor. I–III, rainbows and the Milky Way included,
and less exciting than the morphology, physiology, and habits of exotic and notso-exotic animals, but that are pervasively part of our lives. After all, knowing how
47. Three very good synopses of the debate regarding the relation between Meteor. IV and the ﬁrst
three books as well as other Aristotelian works can be found in Baﬃoni (1981), 17–33, in Louis (1982),
x–xviii, and in Viano (2006), 79 –113; see also Düring (1944/1980), 17–20.
48. See, e.g., Furley (1989) and, of course, the three articles gathered in this forum.
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most49 stuﬀs tend to behave determines to some extent our own behavior and
expectations; in Nelson Goodman’s words, things are full of threats and promises
(1955, 40).
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